Based on an analysis by Liu Honglin of Mankun Blockchain, published by PANews on November 6, 2026, at 13:35 UTC+8. Dates and regulatory developments below reflect that article’s reporting context.
Russia’s move toward regulated cryptocurrency trading and cross-border payments did not remove the intermediaries controlling access to money. It changed which intermediaries could participate—and brought more of them within the domestic regulatory perimeter.
The central tension in Liu Honglin’s account is between trade settlement and capital controls. Exporters and importers needed alternatives to constrained banking channels; Russia’s central bank still wanted oversight of asset transfers and to preserve the ruble’s role in domestic payments.
For exchanges, custodians and businesses receiving stablecoins, the resulting framework raises a practical question: who controls the assets, and who can prevent the recipient from using them?
From a proposed ban to supervised access
Russia’s central bank warned about Bitcoin in January 2014, citing the absence of guarantees, speculative prices, money-laundering and terrorist-financing risks, and restrictions on monetary substitutes.
Support for blockchain technology did not necessarily mean acceptance of private cryptocurrencies. Vladimir Putin’s meeting with Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin at the 2017 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum concerned blockchain applications and connections with local partners, according to the Kremlin’s account cited in the article.
A 2020 law, with its main provisions effective from 2021, established rules for digital financial assets representing claims such as monetary or securities-related rights. Bitcoin did not fall into that category, and domestic cryptocurrency payments for goods and services remained restricted.
On January 20, 2022, the central bank proposed prohibiting cryptocurrency issuance, trading and exchange activity in Russia, alongside mining. The Finance Ministry favored regulation instead. Ivan Chebeskov, then head of its financial policy department, argued that pushing an existing market offshore or underground would make supervision harder.
Six days later, Putin called for agreement between the government and central bank, while pointing to Russia’s electricity resources and skilled workforce as mining advantages.
Banking restrictions changed the settlement problem
Following Russia’s full-scale military action against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, sanctions disrupted established payment arrangements. In March, SWIFT disconnected an initial seven designated Russian entities and relevant subsidiaries under EU rules.
Using other national currencies helped, but did not eliminate reliance on banks willing to process Russian business. The article cites central-bank figures showing the renminbi’s share of Russian export settlement rising from 13% in January 2023 to 35% in September.
After the United States expanded its authority in December 2023 to sanction foreign financial institutions over certain transactions connected to Russia’s military-industrial base, some banks tightened or withdrew services. An April 2024 Reuters report, based on five people familiar with the matter, described businesses turning to VTB’s Shanghai branch and facing lengthy account-opening delays.
Russia’s State Duma passed legislation in July 2024 allowing cryptocurrency settlement for foreign trade. Signed in August, it initially operated through a central-bank experimental framework with limits on participants and duration. In December, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said Russian companies were already using Bitcoin and other digital currencies internationally, including Bitcoin mined domestically.
These arrangements offered another payment route, not an assurance that a foreign counterparty would accept the asset or that conversion would remain available.
Bringing miners and intermediaries onto the record
Russia introduced a formal mining framework in 2024. The Federal Tax Service launched registration in November, requiring companies and individual entrepreneurs to register before operating.
From 2025, miners also had to report production and wallet identifiers electronically by the 20th of the month following receipt of digital currency. Mining-pool participants had related address-reporting obligations, and mining income entered the tax framework.
Those records could connect operators, production and destination wallets. As Liu notes, however, reporting requirements do not ensure truthful declarations or independently prevent capital outflows. Regional restrictions also remained: parts of southern Irkutsk imposed a mining ban in April 2025 lasting until 2031.
The trading market was already substantial. Chainalysis estimated approximately $376.3 billion in crypto assets received by addresses geographically attributed to Russia between July 2024 and June 2025, compared with $273.2 billion for the United Kingdom. This is an estimate of attributed on-chain flows, not a measure of customer deposits or exchange liabilities.
According to the article, Russia’s Digital Currency and Digital Rights Law took effect in September 2026, creating domestic regulated channels for residents to trade cryptocurrency. Ordinary non-qualified investors faced testing, eligible-asset restrictions and purchase limits.
On October 6, the central bank announced the registration of the first five digital custodians and four cryptocurrency exchange institutions. Exchange institutions could conduct over-the-counter transactions using their own funds; custodians would record and transfer relevant assets. These institutions had until September 2027 to align their operations with the new law.
Under the central bank’s explanation cited in the article, ordinary investors who passed testing could buy up to 300,000 rubles of highly liquid cryptocurrencies annually through each intermediary. Overseas trading, outbound transfers and foreign-held crypto assets remained subject to banking, intermediary and reporting requirements. Domestic cryptocurrency payments for goods and services remained prohibited.
Garantex showed where control still sits
The Garantex enforcement case illustrates the limits of moving settlement onto a blockchain.
Originally registered in Estonia but operating mainly in Moscow and St. Petersburg, Garantex lost its Estonian digital-asset services license and was sanctioned by the United States in 2022. It continued operating afterward.
In March 2025, US authorities seized associated domains, German and Finnish authorities seized servers, and the US Justice Department announced charges against two managers. Prosecutors alleged that the platform had processed at least $96 billion in cryptocurrency transactions since 2019 and accused its operators of money laundering and sanctions violations.
Tether subsequently said it had assisted the US Secret Service in freezing $23 million associated with Garantex transactions. The funds were in USDT, whose issuer can restrict transfers through token controls. An on-chain balance therefore did not guarantee that its holder could spend it.
According to an August 2025 US Treasury sanctions determination cited by Liu, people associated with Garantex redirected customers and funds to successor platform Grinex and used the ruble-backed A7A5 token to facilitate the transition. A7A5 was issued by Kyrgyzstan-based Old Vector; the ownership relationships of the associated cross-border settlement company A7 involved Promsvyazbank and businessman Ilan Shor.
The EU’s nineteenth sanctions package targeted A7A5 and related entities in October 2025. The article reports that the United States designated the A7 network as a sanctioned transnational criminal organization in October 2026. Related FinCEN transaction restrictions were still proposals at that point, not final rules.
A different dependency chain—not its removal
Liu’s broader argument is that Russia’s policy shift created supervised channels without resolving every dependency. Dollar stablecoins may be widely accepted but remain exposed to issuer freezes. Ruble-backed alternatives need willing foreign recipients and usable conversion channels. Registered domestic intermediaries provide identifiable supervisory counterparts, but registration alone does not establish solvency or guarantee customer access to assets.
The article also discusses Hong Kong’s stablecoin framework as a possible reference for additional regulated payment options, while emphasizing that mainland Chinese restrictions continue to apply to mainland business and fund transfers. Its core operational point extends beyond any one jurisdiction: receiving a token is not the same as having money available for suppliers, payroll or redemption.
Russia’s experience, as presented in the source, is less a wholesale embrace of decentralized finance than an effort to accommodate selected crypto activities while retaining control over domestic payments, intermediaries and cross-border flows.